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Abstract—It is well known that a game equilibrium can be far
from efficient or fair, due to the misalignment between individual
and social objectives. The focus of this paper is to design a
new mechanism framework that induces an efficient and fair
equilibrium in a general class of games. To achieve this goal,
we propose a taxation framework, which first imposes a tax
on each player based on the perceived payoff (income), and
then redistributes the collected tax to other players properly. By
turning the tax rate, this framework spans the continuum space
between strategic interactions (of selfish players) and altruistic
interactions (of unselfish players), hence provides rich modelling
possibilities. The key challenge in the design of this framework
is the proper taxing rule (i.e., the tax exemption and tax rate)
that induces the desired equilibrium in a wide range of games.
First, we propose a flat tax rate (i.e., a single tax rate for
all players), which is necessary and sufficient for achieving an
efficient equilibrium in any static strategic game with common
knowledge. Then, we provide several tax exemption rules that
achieve some typical fairness criterions (such as Nash bargaining
solution and Shapley value) at the equilibrium. We further
discuss the incentive issue in the implementation of the proposed
taxation mechanism, and illustrate the implementation of the
framework in the game of Prisoners’ Dilemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
A static strategic game models the situation where a set of
rational (self-interested) players make interdependent choices
simultaneously [1]: each player’s payoff depends not only
on his own choice but also on the other players’ choices.
An equilibrium of a static strategic game refers to a stable
outcome of the game, i.e., a combination of players’ preferred
choices from which none of them has the incentive to deviate.
Namely, at an equilibrium, no player can increase his payoff by
unilaterally changing his choice, hence all players will stick on
their choices at the equilibrium, leading to a stable outcome of
the game. Nowadays, static strategic game and its most well-
known solution concept, Nash Equilibrium (NE) [2], have been
widely adopted for the modeling and analysis of competition
and cooperation in various networking systems [3], [4].
In many static strategic games, however, the game equilib-
rium is often not efficient, due to the misalignment between the
individual players’ objectives and the social objective. Specifi-
cally, a game outcome is said to be efficient, or more precisely,
socially efficient [17], if it maximizes the total payoff of all
players (called the social welfare). Such an outcome is often
called a Social Efficiency (SE). Many existing works have
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investigated the performance (efficiency) gap between an NE
and the SE of a game, where the notion of Price-of-Anarchy
(PoA) [18] (resp. Price-of-Stability, PoS [19]) was introduced
to measures the social welfare ratio between the SE and the
worst NE (resp. the best NE). However, both PoA and PoS are
descriptive concepts, in the sense that they only characterize
an existing situation (i.e., how good an equilibrium is), without
providing any constructive way to improve the situation.
In this work, we aim to provide a constructive way to
improve the efficiency of the static strategic game outcome.
Some recent works have tried several ways based on the idea
of “Altruism” to induce the efficient game equilibrium [20]–
[27]. The common idea of these works is to implement an
Altruism Mechanism on top of a game to restructure the rules
or payoffs of the game, so as to create an Altruistic version of
the game, wherein players are willing to behave in an altruistic
manner. More specifically, with the Altruism Mechanism, we
modify each player’s payoff by adding a positive component
proportional to the other players’ payoffs [20]–[22] or the
social welfare [23]–[26]. With such a modification, each player
cares about not only his individual payoff (selfishness) but also
the payoffs of others (altruism), hence is willing to behave in
an altruistic or socially-aware manner.
However, the above Altruism Mechanism has several lim-
itations. First, it focuses only on the efficiency, without con-
sidering the fairness. Namely, it aims at improving the total
payoff of all players (social welfare), while not considering
the balance between the individual payoffs of different players.
Second, it often requires an additional budget (i.e., the positive
component added to each player’s payoff) to incentivize the
altruistic behaviors of players. Sometimes such a budget can
be huge and even infinite [25],1 which prevents the practical
implementation of this mechanism. Moreover, the Altruism
Mechanism is often designed for a specific set of static
strategic games, and may not work in more general game
settings. In this work, we aim to design such a mechanism
that achieves both efficiency and fairness in a wide range
of static strategic games, together with the consideration of
budget feasibility.
B. Solution Approach
We propose a novel taxation framework to achieve our goal.
The key idea is to implement a properly designed Taxation
Mechanism on top of a game (resulting in a Taxation version
of the game) to restructure the rules and payoffs of the game,
1In the mechanism of [25], a requirement for an infinite budget implies
that it is impossible to achieve an efficient outcome in a specific game.
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Fig. 1. The Taxation Mechanism.
such that the individual objectives are properly aligned with
the social objective, hence reach the desired equilibrium. We
design the Taxation Mechanism based on the idea of “income
tax [28]”, which mainly consists of two parts:
1) Taxing Rule, for imposing a tax on each player according
to the player’s perceived payoff (income);
2) Redistribution Rule, for allocating the collected tax (with
budget deduction or compensation according to a pre-
defined budget plan) to other players equally.
More specifically, the taxing rule in our mechanism consists
of two key components as in many real-world income tax
systems [28]: (i) a tax exemption threshold for each player,
denoting the minimal income level at which a player begins to
pay positive taxes, and (ii) a tax rate for each player, denoting
the ratio at which a player is taxed (considering the impact of
the tax exemption threshold). Intuitively, the above Taxation
Mechanism redistributes the perceived payoffs of players, and
makes players care about not only their individual payoffs
(selfishness) but also the payoffs of others (altruism), hence
reconciles the individual players’ objectives with the social
objectives potentially.
Figure 1 illustrates our proposed mechanism, where A is
the total income (payoff) of a player, B is the tax exemption,
C = A − B is the taxable income, D is the tax imposed
on the player, E is the pre-specified budget (which could be
negative), F = D+E is the income tax after budget deduction
or compensation, which is then equally redistributed to other
players (each getting a revenue of G).
Comparing with the Altruism Mechanism in [20]–[27], this
Taxation Mechanism has the following advantages. First, it
generalizes the existing Altruism Mechanism. Second, it is
more flexible due to the additional design dimension of tax
exemption in the payoff reconstruction, which is critical for
reaching the desirable fairness. Third, it works with any given
budget (even negative) from the platform.
C. Contributions
We will study in details the design of the Taxation Mecha-
nism that induces the desired outcomes with the properties of
efficiency and fairness, while considering the budget feasibil-
ity. It is notable that the tax redistribution rule and the budget
plan are given in advance, hence the key problem is to design
a proper taxing rule (i.e., tax exemptions and tax rates for all
players). Our key theoretical results are as follows:
1) Efficiency: We first show that the efficiency of outcome
only depends on the tax rates, and is independent of the tax
exemptions. Based on this observation, we propose the effi-
cient tax rates (that achieve the efficient outcome), which are
identical (flat) for all players, and have a simple relationship
with the player number and the budget. We further show that
such an efficient flat tax rate is necessary and sufficient for
achieving an efficient outcome in any static strategic game
with common knowledge [29].2
It is worth noting that the above result doesn’t rely on
any additional assumption (except common knowledge). The
reason is that the above flat tax rate can guarantee that for any
static strategic game (with common knowledge), its Taxation
version must have at least one NE (which is the SE), even if
the original game doesn’t have an NE.
2) Fairness: We show that the tax exemptions determine
how the social welfare is distributed among players, given
the efficient flat tax rate derived above. Thus, by tuning the
tax exemptions carefully, we can achieve any desired social
welfare division, hence any fairness criterion. As an illustrative
example, we provide the tax exemptions that achieve several
typical fairness criterions such as the Max-min fairness [30],
in which the social welfare is divided (among players) in such
a way that the minimal payoff of players is maximized.
To our best knowledge, this is the first work that proposes
a Taxation Mechanism for inducing both efficient and fair
outcomes in static strategic games. In addition to theoretical
results mentioned above, we also illustrate the implementation
of the proposed mechanism in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game
[1], a widely-used example in game theory. The key contribu-
tions of this work are summarized as follows.
• Novel Framework (Section III): The proposed Taxation
Mechanism generalizes the existing Altruism Mechanism,
and can induce the desired outcome with the properties
of efficiency, fairness, and budget feasibility, in any static
strategic game with common knowledge. Moreover, it
spans the continuum space between strategic interactions
(of selfish players) and altruistic interactions (of unselfish
players), hence provides rich modeling possibilities.
• Efficiency and Fairness (Sections IV–V): We propose a
simple flat tax rate depending on the number of players and
the budget, which is necessary and sufficient for achieving
an efficient outcome (in any static strategic game with
common knowledge). We further show how to tune the
tax exemptions to achieve a desirable fairness criterion.
• Implementation and Incentive Issue (Section VI): We il-
lustrate the implementation of the proposed mechanism in
the game of Prisoners’ Dilemma, and discuss the related
incentive issue in the practical implementation.
II. RELATED WORK
The inefficiency of a game equilibrium has been long
recognized in economics. Many economists have investigated
2Common knowledge is a mild assumption widely used in the area of game
theory [29]. It means that each player is fully aware of the rules and payoffs
of the game, and meanwhile each player knows that each other player is fully
aware of the rules and payoffs of the game.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXISTING WORKS
Efficiency Fairness BudgetPositive Zero Negative
[20], [21]
√ × √ × ×
[22], [23]
√ × × √ ×
[24]–[27]
√ × √ × ×
Our work
√ √ √ √ √
and measured such an efficiency loss, via the notions of PoA
[18] and PoS [19]. Some recent works proposed several ways
to improve the efficiency of the game equilibrium [20]–[27].
They implemented an “Altruism Mechanism” on top of a
game, so as to alter each player’s payoff by adding a positive
component proportional to the other players’ payoffs [20]–[22]
or the social welfare [23]–[27]. However, these works focused
only on the efficiency in the outcome, without considering the
fairness issue. Moreover, some of them (e.g., [20], [21], [24]–
[27]) required an additional budget to incentivize the altruistic
behaviors of players. Our proposed Taxation Mechanism gen-
eralizes the Altruism Mechanism, and achieves both efficiency
and fairness in a wide range of static strategic games with
common knowledge, under any given (even negative) budget.
We summarize the key features of the existing works [20]–[27]
and our work in Table I.
Although our proposed mechanism requires some assump-
tions (e.g., common knowledge), it has several encouraging
features, comparing with the numerous existing mechanism
design results. First, it considers not only efficiency but also
fairness at the outcome. Second, its implementation complex-
ity is very low, while many mechanism design approaches
involve solving problems that are NP-hard. Hence, our work
opens up a new direction of game mechanism design under a
different assumption from many existing results.
III. THE TAXATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide the theoretical framework of the
proposed mechanism. We first review some basic concepts in
static strategic games, then propose the Taxation Mechanism,
and finally derive the taxing rule (under any given budget) that
achieves the efficiency and fairness in the outcome.
A. Static Strategic Game
We first review some basic concepts in static strategic games
[1], which are critical for our later discussions.
In a static strategic game, a set of N players make inter-
dependent choices simultaneously. Each player is rational
(self-interested), aiming at maximizing his own payoff. As
in many existing game literature (e.g., [1]), we assume that
players have common knowledge of the game [29]: each player
knows the rules and payoffs of the game, and also knows that
each other player knows the rules and payoffs of the game.3
Formally, a static strategic game can be defined as follows.
3Games without common knowledge require players to reveal their private
information credibly, and is often the focus of incentive mechanism design
(e.g., auction), which is beyond the scope of our work.
Definition 1 (Static Strategic Game [1]). A static strategic
game, denoted by G , (N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), is given by:
• Player: a set N = {1, 2, · · · , N} of rational players;
• Strategy: a set Si of strategies for each player i ∈ N ;
• Payoff: a payoff function ui : S1×· · ·×SN → R for each
player i ∈ N , which maps every possible strategy profile
to a real number, i.e., the payoff of player i.
Let si ∈ Si denote the strategy of player i ∈ N , s ,
(s1, · · · , sN ) ∈ S1 × · · · × SN denote the strategy profile of
all players, and s−i , (s1, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sN ) denote
the strategy profile of all players other than i. For notational
convenience, we will also write s as (si, s−i). Then, the payoff
of player i under a particular strategy profile s can be written
as ui(s) or ui(si, s−i). The social welfare is defined as the
total payoff of all players, denoted by
W (s) =
∑
i∈N
ui(s). (1)
An NE refers to a stable strategy profile (outcome) from
which none of the players has the incentive to deviate [2].
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium—NE [2]). A strategy profile
s∗ , (s∗1, · · · , s∗N ) is an NE, if for every player i ∈ N ,
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s∗−i), ∀s′i ∈ Si.
A strategy profile (outcome) is socially efficient [17], or
simply efficient, if it maximizes the social welfare in defined
(1). Such an outcome is often called a Social Efficiency (SE).
Definition 3 (Social Efficiency—SE [17]). A strategy profile
s◦ , (s◦1, · · · , s◦N ) is an SE, if
W (s◦) ≥W (s′), ∀s′ ∈ S1 × · · · × SN .
Note that an NE describes what is likely to occur in the
game as a stable outcome, while an SE describes what is
desirable from the social perspective. In practice, however,
there can be a large gap between NE and SE [18], [19].
Our focus in this work is to restructure the rules of the
game through a properly designed mechanism, such that the
modified game produces an NE that is efficient and fair for the
original game, i.e., “what is likely to happen (in the modified
game) is what is desired (for the original game)”.
B. The Taxation Mechanism
We propose a Taxation framework, which implements a
Taxation Mechanism on top of a game to restructure the
rules or payoffs of the game and achieve the desired outcome
via the modified game. As shown in Figure 1, the Taxation
Mechanism is designed based on the idea of “income tax [28]”,
and mainly consists of two parts: (i) a taxing rule for imposing
income tax on each player, and (ii) a redistribution rule for
reallocating the imposed tax back to players.
1) Taxing Rule: As in many real-world income tax systems
[28], our taxing rule consists of two components:
• A tax exemption δi ≥ 0 for each player i ∈ N , denoting the
minimum income level at which he begins to pay positive
taxes;
• A tax rate ρi ∈ [0, 1] for each player i ∈ N , denoting the
ratio at which he is taxed, considering his tax exemption.4
For convenience, we denote δ , (δ1, · · · , δN ) as the tax
exemption vector and ρ , (ρ1, · · · , ρN ) as the tax rate vector.
Then, the taxing rule can be formally written as {δ,ρ}, which
specifies a taxing rule {δi, ρi} for every player i ∈ N .
Given the taxing rule {δi, ρi} for player i, the income tax
imposed on player i under a strategy profile s is:5
φi(s) = (ui(s)− δi) · ρi, (2)
where ui(s) is the total income (payoff) of player i under s,
and ui(s)− δi is the taxable income.
2) Redistribution Rule: The tax collected from a player is
first manipulated (deducted or compensated) according to a
pre-defined budget plan (i.e., E in Figure 1), and then allocated
to other players equally. Let β > 0 denote the ratio of the
tax after manipulation and before manipulation, called budget
factor. In Figure 1, we have: β = FD =
D+E
D . The budget
factor β fully characterizes a budget plan:
• If β < 1, then F = βD < D, implying that the platform
extracts a portion (1− β)D of received tax as revenue;
• If β > 1, then F = βD > D, implying that the platform
provides a budget (β − 1)D for players as subsidy;
• If β = 1, then F = D, implying that that the platform
neither extracts revenue nor provides subsidy, hence the
system is budget balance.
Given the budget factor β, the revenue that each player
(other than i) gains from the tax φi(s) of player i is,
pii(s) = φi(s) · β · 1N−1 , (3)
where the factor 1N−1 implies that N − 1 other players share
the tax (multiply by the budget factor β) equally.
3) Taxation Version of Game: Based on the above taxing
rule and redistribution rule, we can define the new payoff of
each player i ∈ N under the taxation mechanism as:
u˜i(s) = ui(s)− φi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
pij(s). (4)
We refer to the new game with the new payoffs defined in (4)
as a Taxation Version of the original game. Formally,
Definition 4 (Taxation Version of Game). For any static
strategic game G = (N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), a (δ,ρ)-
Taxation Version of G, denoted by G(δ,ρ), is defined as
G(δ,ρ) , (N , {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N ), (5)
where u˜i is given in (4), i.e., the new payoff of player i in the
Taxation Mechanism with the taxing rule {δ,ρ}.
4Corresponding to Figure 1, we have: δi = B and ρi = DC =
D
A−B .
5Precisely, we should write the income tax φi(s) as φi(s, δi, ρi). Here we
omit δi and ρi mainly for the purpose of writing convenience.
Intuitively, a Taxation Version of a game represents a joint
system of the original game and the Taxation Mechanism,
where players first interact and get paid according to the
original game rules, and then are taxed based on the perceived
payoffs according to the Taxation Mechanism.
Our focus in this work is to design a proper taxing rule
{δ,ρ} such that the (δ,ρ)-Taxation Version of any static
strategic game G (with common knowledge) produces the
desired outcome for the original game G. We emphasize that
the taxing rule {δ,ρ} is what we need to design, while the
budget plan (i.e., β) is a given system parameter.
Before designing the taxing rule, we first provide several
useful properties for the above (δ,ρ)-Taxation Version.6
Lemma 1. With a flat tax rate (i.e., ρi = ρ, ∀i ∈ N ), an SE
of G(δ,ρ) must be an SE of G, and vice versa.
Lemma 1 states that if a flat tax rate is adopted, then an
efficient outcome of the Taxation Version game G(δ,ρ) is also
efficient to the original game G, and vice versa. This inspires us
to focus on those taxing rules with the flat tax rate. However,
Lemma 1 does not tell us how to reach the SE at an equilibrium
of G(δ,ρ). We will further discuss this in Theorem 1 of the
next section.
We further notice that with a particular flat tax rate ρ, the
payoff of each player i defined in (4) can be written as:
u˜i(s) = (1− ρ) · ui(s) + ρ · a ·
∑
j 6=i
uj(s) + ρ · b, (6)
where a , βN−1 and b , δi− βN−1 ·
∑
j 6=i δj . From (6), we can
see that with the increase of ρ, each player cares less about
his own payoff (less selfish), but more about other players’
payoffs (more unselfish). Therefore, our Taxation framework
spans the continuum space between strategic interactions (of
selfish players) and altruistic interactions (of unselfish players)
by turning the taxing rate ρ from 0 to 1.
IV. EFFICIENCY
We now study the efficient taxing rule {δ,ρ} that produces
the efficient outcome. Inspired by Lemma 1, we narrow our
focus within the taxing rules with the flat tax rate (i.e., ρi =
ρ, ∀i ∈ N ). In this case, an efficient outcome for the Taxation
Version of a game G is also efficient for G.
For notational convenience, we define c , βN−1+β and ∆ ,∑
i∈N δi, both are constant with regard to s. Formally, we
have the following efficient taxing rule.
Theorem 1 (Efficiency). A taxing rule {δ,ρ} is efficient for
any tax exemptions δ under the following flat tax rate,
ρi = ρ =
N − 1
N − 1 + β , ∀i ∈ N . (7)
With the above tax rule in (7), for any static game G, its
Taxation Version G(δ,ρ) will generate an efficient outcome
that maximizes the social welfares of G(δ,ρ) in (5) and G.
Theorem 1 shows that the efficiency of a taxing rule {δ,ρ}
6Due to space limit, we put all the proofs in the technical report [31].
only depends on the tax rates ρ, while is independent of the
tax exemptions δ. Moreover, it shows that a flat tax rate (7)
is sufficient for achieving an efficient outcome for any static
strategic game with common knowledge.
It is worth noting that even if the original game G does not
have an equilibrium, our framework with the proposed flat
tax rate (7) can still induce an efficient equilibrium outcome
from the Taxation Version G(δ,ρ). This is because for any
static strategic game G, its Taxation Version G(δ,ρ) must have
at least one efficient equilibrium (i.e., the SE) with the flat
tax rate (7). In fact, the above Taxation Version G(δ,ρ) is a
potential game, with the social welfare in (1) as the potential
function.
We will show that the flat tax rate (7) is also the unique tax
rate that can achieve efficient outcomes in all static strategic
games with common knowledge. Formally,
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). A taxing rule {δ,ρ} is efficient
for all static strategic games (with common knowledge), if
and only if the tax rates satisfy (7).
We have shown the sufficiency of (7) in Theorem 1, hence
only need to prove the necessity of (7), that is, “there does not
exist a different taxing rule {δ,ρ} from (7) that is efficient
for all static strategic games (with common knowledge)”. To
prove this, we only need to find a static strategic game in
which the taxing rule {δ,ρ} satisfying (7) is the only taxing
rule that can generate efficient outcomes.
We can further see that the efficient tax rate (7) depends
only on the player number N and the budget factor β.
Observation 1. The efficient tax rate (7) increases with the
player number N , and decreases with the budget factor β.
V. FAIRNESS
We now study the taxing rule {δ,ρ} that produces fair
equilibrium outcomes. According to Theorems 1 and 2, the
flat tax rate in (7) is sufficient for efficiency, while the tax
exemptions δ do not affect efficiency. This implies that we
can adjust δ, while fixing the flat tax rate as in (7), to achieve
the desired fairness without affecting the efficiency.
Substitute the flat tax rate (7) into (4), we can rewrite the
payoff of each player i in the Taxation Version G(δ,ρ) as:
u˜i(s) = c ·W (s)− c ·∆ + δi, (8)
By Theorem 1, there exists an efficient equilibrium s∗ of
G(δ,ρ) that maximizes the social welfare of both G(δ,ρ)
and G, i.e., s∗ = s◦ , arg maxsW (s). Under this efficient
equilibrium s∗, each player’s playoff is,
u˜i(s
∗) = c ·W − c ·∆ + δi, (9)
where W ,W (s◦) is the maximum of W (s).
By (9), we can see that each player’s payoff, under the
efficient equilibrium s∗ achieved from the flat tax rate (7), is
determined by the tax exemptions δ, as both c and W are
constants and ∆ depends on δ only. Formally,
(a) (b)
C D
C (2, 2) (0, 3)
D (3, 0) (1, 1)
C D
C (2, 2) (1.5, 1.5)
D (1.5, 1.5) (1, 1)
TABLE II
(A) THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME; (B) THE TAXATION VERSION
WITH ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5 AND δ1 = δ2 = 0.
Observation 2. (i) for any player i ∈ N , his payoff u˜i(s∗)
increases with δi and decreases with δj ,∀j 6= i; (ii) for any
two players i, j ∈ N , u˜i(s∗) ≥ u˜j(s∗) if and only if δi ≥ δj .
Observation 2 implies that the tax exemptions δ can be used
to adjust how the generated social welfare is distributed among
players. More specifically,
• According to (i), to increase (or decrease) the payoff of
a player i, we can simply increase (or decrease) the tax
exemption δi for player i;
• According to (ii), to ensure the payoff of player i is larger
(or smaller) than player j, we need to set a larger (or
smaller) tax exemption δi for player i.
Based on the above, we can adjust tax exemptions δ to achieve
any desired fairness together with efficiency.
Next, we provide the tax exemptions δ for several typical
fairness criterions such as the Max-min fairness [30], in which
the social welfare is divided (among players) in such a way
that the minimal payoff of players is maximized. Due to space
limit, we put the detailed discussions regarding other fairness
criterions in our online technical report [31].
For ease of illustration, we assume that β = 1 (strictly
budget balance), and hence, c = 1N and u˜i(s
∗) = WN − ∆N +δi.
Let ω ∈ (−∞,∞) denote an arbitrary real number.
Lemma 2 (Max-min Fairness). If δi = δj = ω, ∀i, j ∈ N
(i.e., flat tax exemption), then
u˜i(s
∗) = WN , ∀i ∈ N .
That is, all players share the total social welfare equally, which
is a special case of the Max-min fairness [30]
VI. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE
To illustrate the implementation of the proposed taxation
mechanism in practice, we now implement it in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [1] as an illustrative example.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, two players make choices
with strategic inter-dependence. Each player can choose the
strategy “Cooperate (C)” or “Defect (D)”. The payoffs of
players under different strategy profiles are illustrated in Table
II(a), where each row (or column) denotes the choice of player
1 (or 2), and the numbers in each cell denote the payoffs of
both players under a particular strategy profile. We can see
that the unique NE of this game is (D, D), where both players
choose “Defect”. However, the unique SE is (C, C), where
both players choose “Cooperate”.
Now we implement the Taxation Mechanism to the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. For ease of illustration, we assume that
β = 1 (strictly budget balance). According to Theorem 1, the
efficient taxing rule is: ρ = N−1N = 0.5. Note that the tax
exemptions will not affect the efficiency, and thus we take the
zero tax exemptions (i.e., δ1 = δ2 = 0) as an example. In
this case, the new payoffs of players (after taxation) can be
computed by (6), and illustrated in Table II(b). We can see
that the unique NE of the new Taxation Version game is (C,
C), which is an efficient outcome of both games.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a Taxation Mechanism and design
the associated taxing rule for inducing efficient and fair
equilibrium in static strategic games. This framework provides
rich modeling possibilities, and spans the continuum space
between strategic interactions (of selfish players) and altruistic
interactions (of unselfish players). We derive the tax rates
which are necessary and sufficient for achieving an efficient
outcome in any static strategic game with common knowledge,
and provide several tax exemption examples that achieve some
typical fairness criterions.
There are several interesting future directions. First, the
current Taxation Mechanism is only applicable for games with
common knowledge. It would be interesting to extend it to
games with incomplete information. Second, in the current
framework, we apply a single tax rate for each player. It is
meaningful to extend it to the case of progressive tax rates as
in real-world income tax systems.
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